CITY WAR

Securing Singapore, Defeating History

These three maps depict (1) the Coalition assault on Singapore; (2) the German assault on Stalingrad in 1942; (3) and the Japanese successful conquest of Singapore in 1942. The hope is to confirm the prospect of Coalition success and, if needed, offer another/additional path to reduce (secure) the city.

The Coalition hope for lodgement shadows the German inital rush to seize Stalingrad without a fight; a quick thrust, as this map depicts, would cut the city in two with a drive to the Volga River, and then defeat the Russian resistance in detail. That push failed, and instead a bitter—to say the least—fight, house-to-house, unfolded over the next three months. In mid-November 1942, the Soviets launched a counterattack that encircled and then destroyed the 300,000 man 6th Army and part of 4th Panzer Army investing Stalingrad. And so, the turning point of the war arrived in the east, perhaps the entire European theater, and perhaps all of World War II.

Do not mourn the 6th Army. They all were ardent Nazis, had committed many atrocities on the eastern front, and expressed nothing but contempt for their Russian opponents matched by a hubris in German fighting ability, both man and machine. Still, it was an elite force from top to bottom, and its elimination registers this battle as the most important in history.

Coalition forces can do better.

To this end, Japan’s attack on Singapore [from the landward side] compelled the British surrender of 130,000 troops in but two weeks—and this result coming at the hands of a Japanese assault force of 30,000 troops. The secret to this result: water. Once the fresh water sources on the island were either captured or threatened with destruction, the British command reasoned surrender was necessary to spare the civilian population immense suffering.

Given these parallels, a lodgement with a landward element as well may be best; further, find the water.

Defeating History

Military history decry’s the idea of seizing city objectives—that effort usually bleeds the attacker white. Famously, even an ill-trained conscript can defend a strongpoint in a city, and devastate even the most highly trained assault force.

The lodgement in Singapore can efface this memory forever. Your attack plan capitalizes on the technology, fighting spirit, and joint combat arms emerging in the past, but maturing now. You will defeat not just IL forces in Singapore and the vicinity, but history. This military accomplishment will resonate globally as being that of US-led coalition forces doing the impossible—seizing a densely populated city with minimum loss to property and population, all the while sparing the attacking force great loss but inflicting immense losses on the enemy. Your military aim has become your political purpose, and all the more crucial to be successfully done.

The risk to reward for this operation has been answered. Think of the stakes: Russian wars in Chechnya and now Ukraine flailing against city targets that symbolize the crudeness of Russian military practices: Grozny, Mariupol. Should US-led forces master population densities in cities or littorals, the military success and advantage speak for itself.

The risk is present. Consider the comment of Japan's general in charge of the capture of Singapore:

“My attack on Singapore was a bluff, a bluff that worked. I had 30,000 men and was outnumbered more than three to one. I knew if I had to fight long for Singapore I would be beaten. That is why the [British] surrender had to be at once. I was very frightened all the time that the British would discover our numerical weakness and lack of supplies and force me into disastrous street fighting.” – Japanese Army General Tomoyuki Yamashita

Sources

Stalingrad

Beevor, Antony. Stalingrad. New York: Viking, 1998. Pp. 493
Erickson, John. Stalin's War with Germany. 2 Vols. New Haven:
   Yale University Press, 1999.
Glantz, David M. Armageddon in Stalingrad: September-
   November 1942. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
   2009. Pp. 896

Stalingrad Video (17 minutes)

Singapore

Leasor, James. Singapore: the battle that changed the world.
   Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1968. Pp. 325
Masanobu Tsuji. Singapore, 1941-1942: the Japanese version of
   the Malayan campaign of World War II. Trans. Margaret E.
   Lake. Edited by H.V. Howe. New York: Oxford University
   Press, 1988. Pp. 358
Smith, Colin. Singapore Burning: heroism and surrender
   in World War II. London: Viking, 2005. Pp. 628

Singapore Video (13 minutes)

Reference Guide, mjf 2025

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Japan's Joint Offensive in Southeast Asia

The Fall of Singapore (mid-February 1942) represents the climax of Japanese success in Southeast Asia. Prior to the island’s capitulation, Japanese land forces, supported by air and sea units, had overrun Malaya. Further, a British naval task force had sortied from Singapore toward the South China Sea to intercept the Japanese invasion force heading for Malaya. Japanese planes found this flotilla on December 10, 1941 (three days after Pearl Harbor), and sunk two prized British ships in a matter of hours, the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. Subsequently, Japan would win the Battle of Java Sea (February 27, 1942), destroying a combined American, Dutch, British, and Australian fleet. In every facet, the Japanese emerged triumphant, land, sea, air. The joint effort and affect was undeniable. The Japanese air raids on Pearl Harbor and the American base on the Philippines (December 8, 1942) add to the totality of this joint operation that comes into clear focus. In this way, nothing could or did stop Japan from completing the conquest of Southeast Asia. Japan then would turn its attention to the American forces in the Pacific.

Coalition forces must accomplish this feat of joint operations, and do something more than merely follow in the footsteps of militarized Japan, an unapologetically imperial power. Restoration of the status quo and the safeguarding of Southeast Asia certainly helps dispel accusations of Coalition aggression. More, something must be done to address the joint reality being tested in this fight. While the Japanese offensive in the Pacific helped usher in the paradigm shift of battleship to carrier as the capital ship, joint operations today may well discard the need for any reference to a capital ship. The carrier simply is too vulnerable to fire; smaller ships will have to take the task force lead. Charting this impact of joint operations becomes a key part of assessing the restoration of the Strait of Malacca—how to wage a naval war with no identity of a capital ship.